snmalloc/docs/StrictProvenance.md

StrictProvenance Architectures

To aid code auditing and support of novel architectures, such as CHERI, which explicitly track pointer provenance and bounds, snmalloc makes heavy use of a CapPtr<T, B> wrapper type around T* values. You can think of the annotation B on a CapPtr<T, B> as capturing something about the role of the pointer, e.g.:

• A pointer to a whole chunk or slab, derived from an internal void*.
• A pointer to a particular allocation, destined for the user program
• A putative pointer returned from the user program

You can also view the annotation B as characterising the set of operations that are supported on this pointer, such as

• nothing (because we haven't checked that it's actually a valid pointer)
• memory access within a certain range (e.g, a chunk or an allocation)
• requesting manipulation of the virtual memory mappings

Most architectures and platforms cannot enforce these restrictions outside of static constraints, but CHERI enables software to constrain its future use of particular pointers and snmalloc imposes strong constraints on its client(s) use of memory it manages. The remainder of this document...

• gives a "quick start" guide,
• provides a summary of the constraints imposed on clients,
• describes the StrictProvenance capptr_* functions provided by ds/ptrwrap.h, the Architecture Abstraction Layer (AAL), and the Platform Abstraction Layer (PAL).

Limitations

The CapPtr<T, B> and capptr_* primitives and derived functions are intended to guide developers in useful directions; they are not security mechanisms in and of themselves. For non-CHERI architectures, the whole edifice crumbles in the face of an overzealous reinterpret_cast<> or unsafe_*ptr call. On CHERI, these are likely to elicit capability violations, but may not if all subsequent access happen to be within the architecturally-enforced bounds.

Quick Start Guide

What will I see?

In practice, CapPtr<T, B> and the details of B overtly show themselves only in primitive operations or when polymorphism across B is required. (Or, sadly, when looking at compilation errors or demangled names in a debugger.) All the concrete forms we have found useful have layers of aliasing to keep the verbosity down: capptr::B<T> is a CapPtr<T, capptr::bounds::B> with capptr::bounds::B itself an alias for a capptr::bound<...> type-level object. This trend of aliasing continues into higher-level abstractions, such as the freelist, wherein one finds, for example, freelist::HeadPtr, which expands to a type involving several CapPtrs and associated annotations.

How do I safely get an ordinary pointer to reveal to the client?

Neglecting platform-specific details of getting authority to address space and associating memory in the first place, almost all memory manipulated by snmalloc comes from the AddressSpaceManager. Its reserve(size) method returns a capptr::Chunk<void>; this pointer conveys full authority to the region of size at which it points. To derive a pointer that is suitable for client use, we must

• further spatially refine the pointer: adjust its offset with pointer_offset and use capptr_bound<T, capptr::bounds::AllocFull> and
• shed address space control: use PAL::capptr_to_user_address_control() to convert AllocFull to Alloc.

If no additional spatial refinement is required, because the entire chunk is intended for client use,

• shed address space control: use PAL::capptr_to_user_address_control() to obtain a ChunkUser-bounded pointer, then
• use capptr_chunk_is_alloc to capture intent, converting ChunkUser to Alloc without architectural consequence.

At this point, we hold a capptr::Alloc<T>; use capptr_reveal() to obtain the underlying T*.

How do I safely ingest an ordinary pointer from the client?

First, we must admit that, for all its majesty, CapPtr's coverage is merely an impediment to, rather than a complete defense against, malicious client behavior even on CHERI-enabled architectures. Further protection is an open research project at MSR.

Nevertheless, if adding a new kind of deallocation, we suggest following the existing flows when given a void* p_raw from the client:

• Begin by calling p_wild = capptr_from_client(p_raw) to annotate it as AllocWild and avoid using the raw form thereafter.

• Check the Wild pointer for domestication with p_tame = capptr_domesticate<SharedState>(state_ptr, p_wild); p_tame will be a capptr::Alloc and will alias p_wild or will be nullptr. At this point, we have no more use for p_wild.

• We may now probe the Pagemap; either p_tame is a pointer we have given out or nullptr, or this access may trap (especially on platforms where domestication is just a rubber stamp). This will give us access to the associated MetaEntry and, if necessary, a Chunk-bounded pointer to the entire backing region.

• If desired, we can now validate other attributes of the provided capability, including its length, base, and permissions. In fact, we can even go further and reconstruct the capability we would have given out for the indicated allocation, allowing for exact comparison.

Eventually we would like to reliably detect references to free objects as part of these flows, especially as frees can change the type of metadata found at the head of a chunk. When that is possible, we will add guidance that only reads of non-pointer scalar types are to be performed until after such tests have confirmed the object's liveness. Until then, we have stochastic defenses (e.g., encode in src/mem/freelist.h) later on.

What happened to my cast operators?

Because CapPtr<T, B> are not the kinds of pointers C++ expects to manipulate, static_cast<> and reinterpret_cast<> are not applicable. Instead, CapPtr<T, B> exposes as_void(), template as_static<U>(), and template as_reinterpret<U>() to perform static_cast<void*>, static_cast<U*>, and reinterpret_cast<U*> (respectively). Please use the first viable option from this list, reserving reinterpret_cast for more exciting circumstances.

StrictProvenance in More Detail

Tracking pointer provenance and bounds enables software to constrain uses of particular pointers in ways that are not available with traditional protection mechanisms. For example, while code may have a pointer that spans its entire C stack, it may construct a pointer that authorizes access only to a particular stack allocation (e.g., a buffer) and use this latter pointer while copying data. Even if an attacker is able to control the length of the copy, the bounds imposed upon pointers involved can ensure that an overflow is impossible. (On the other hand, if the attacker can influence both the bounds and the copy length, an overflow may still be possible; in practice, however, the two concerns are often sufficiently separated.) For malloc() in particular, it is enormously beneficial to be able to impose bounds on returned pointers: it becomes impossible for allocator clients to use a pointer from malloc() to access adjacent allocations! (Temporal concerns still apply, in that live allocations can overlap prior, now-dead allocations. Stochastic defenses are employed within snmalloc and deterministic defenses are ongoing research at MSR.)

Borrowing terminology from CHERI, we speak of the authority (to a subset of the address space) held by a pointer and will justify actions in terms of this authority. While many kinds of authority can be envisioned, herein we will mean either

• spatial authority to read/write/execute within a single interval within the address space, or
• vmmap authority to request modification of the virtual page mappings for a given range of addresses.

We may bound the authority of a pointer, deriving a new pointer with a subset of its progenitor's authority; this is assumed to be an ambient action requiring no additional authority. Dually, given two pointers, one with a subset of the other's authority, we may amplify the less-authorized, constructing a pointer with the same address but with increased authority (up to the held superset authority).[^amplifier-state]

Constraints Imposed Upon Allocations

snmalloc ensures that returned pointers are bounded to no more than the slab entry used to back each allocation. It may be useful, mostly for debugging, to more precisely bound returned pointers to the actual allocation size,[^bounds-precision] but this is not required for security. The pointers returned from alloc() will also be stripped of their vmmap authority, if supported by the platform, ensuring that clients cannot manipulate the page mapping underlying snmalloc's address space.

realloc()-ation has several policies that may be sensible. We choose a fairly simple one for the moment: resizing in ways that do not change the backing allocation's snmalloc size class are left in place, while any change to the size class triggers an allocate-copy-deallocate sequence. Even if realloc() leaves the object in place, the returned pointer should have its authority bounded as if this were a new allocation (and so may have less authority than realloc()'s pointer argument if sub-slab-entry bounds are being applied). (Notably, this policy is compatible with the existence of size-parameterized deallocation functions: the result of realloc() is always associated with the size class corresponding to the requested size. By contrast, shrinking in place in ways that changed the size class would require tracking the largest size ever associated with the allocation.)

Impact of Constraints On Deallocation

Previous editions of snmalloc stored metadata at "superslab" boundaries in the address space and relied on address arithmetic to map from small allocations to their associated metadata. These operations relied on being able to take pointers out of bounds, and so posed challenges for StrictProvenance architectures. The current edition of snmalloc instead follows pointers (starting from TLS or global roots), using address arithmetic only to derive indicies into these metadata pointers.

When the allocator client returns memory (or otherwise refers to an allocation), we will be careful to use the lower bound address, not the indicated address per se, for looking up the allocation. The indicated address may be out of bounds, while StrictProvenance architectures should ensure that bounds are monotonically non-increasing, and so the lower bound will always be within the original allocation.

Object Lookup

snmalloc extends the traditional allocator interface with the template<Boundary> void* external_pointer(void*) family of functions, which generate additional pointers to live allocations. To ensure that this function is not used as an amplification oracle, it must construct a return pointer with the same validity as its input even as it internally accesses metadata. We make external_pointer use pointer_offset on the user-provided pointer, ensuring that the result has no more authority than the client already held.

XXX It may be worth requiring that the input pointer authorize the entire object? What are the desired security properties here?

Adapting the Implementation

Design Overview

For the majority of operations, no StrictProvenance-specific reasoning, beyond applying bounds, need be entertained. However, as regions of memory move into and out of an AddressSpaceManagerCore and ChunkAllocator, care must be taken to recover (and preserve) the internal, vmmap-authorizing pointers from the user's much more tightly bounded pointers.

We store these internal pointers inside metadata, at different locations for each state:

• For free chunks in AddressSpaceManagerCores, the next pointers themselves will be internal pointers. That is, the head of each list in the AddressSpaceManagerCore and the (coerced) next pointers in each MetaEntry will be suitable for internal use.

• Once outside the AddressSpaceManager, chunks have a Metaslab associated with them, and we can store internal pointers therein (in the MetaCommon chunk field).

Within each slab, there is one or more free list of objects. We take the position that free list entries should be suitable for return, i.e., with authority bounded to their backing slab entry. (However, the contents of free memory may be dangerous to expose to the user and require clearing prior to handing out.)

Static Pointer Bound Taxonomy

We introduce a multi-dimensional space of bounds. The facets are enum class-es in snmalloc::capptr::dimension.

• Spatial captures the intended spatial extent / role of the pointer: either Alloc-ation or Chunk.

• AddressSpaceControl captures whether the pointer conveys control of its address space.

• Wildness captures whether the pointer has been checked to belong to this allocator.

These dimensions are composited using a capptr::bound<> type that we use as B in CapPtr<T, B>. This is enforced (loosely) using the ConceptBound C++20 concept.

The namespace snmalloc::capptr::bounds contains particular points in the space of capptr::bound<> types:

• bounded to a region of more than MAX_SIZECLASS_SIZE bytes with address space control, Chunk;
• bounded to a region of more than MAX_SIZECLASS_SIZE bytes without address space control, ChunkUser;
• bounded to a smaller region but with address space control, AllocFull;
• bounded to a smaller region and without address space control, Alloc;
• bounded to a smaller region, without address space control, and unverified, AllocWild.

Primitive Architectural Operations

Several new functions are introduced to AALs to capture primitives of the Architecture.

• CapPtr<T, Bout> capptr_bound(CapPtr<U, Bin> a, size_t sz) spatially bounds the pointer a to have authority ranging only from its current target to its current target plus sz bytes (which must be within a's authority). No imprecision in authority is permitted. The bounds annotations must obey capptr_is_spatial_refinement.

Ultimately, all address space manipulated by snmalloc comes from its Platform's primitive allocator. An arena is a region returned by that provider. The AddressSpaceManager divides arenas into large allocations and manages their life cycles. snmalloc's (new, as of snmalloc2) heap layouts ensure that metadata associated with any object are reachable through globals, meaning no explicit amplification is required.

Primitive Platform Operations

• CapPtr<void, Bout> capptr_to_user_address_control(CapPtr<T, Bin> f) sheds authority over the address space from the CapPtr, on platforms where that is possible. On CheriBSD, specifically, this strips the VMMAP software permission, ensuring that clients cannot have the kernel manipulate heap pages. The annotation Bout is computed as a function of Bin. In future architectures, this is increasingly likely to be a no-op.

Backend-Provided Operations

• CapPtr<T, Bout> capptr_domesticate(Backend::LocalState *, CapPtr<T, Bin> ptr) allows the backend to test whether ptr is sensible, by some definition thereof. The annotation Bout is computed as a function of Bin. Bin is required to be Wild, and Bout is Tame but otherwise identical.

Constructed Operators

• capptr_chunk_is_alloc converts a capptr::ChunkUser<T> to a capptr::Alloc<T> with no additional bounding; it is intended to ease auditing.

• capptr_reveal converts a capptr::Alloc<void> to a void*, annotating where we mean to return a pointer to the user.

• capptr_reveal_wild converts a capptr::AllocWild<void> to a void*, annotating where we mean to return a wild pointer to the user (in external_pointer, e.g., where the result is just an offset of the user's pointer).

Endnotes

[^mmu-perms] Pointer authority generally intersects with MMU-based authorization. For example, software using a pointer with both write and execute authority will still find that it cannot write to pages considered read-only by the MMU nor will it be able to execute non-executable pages. Generally speaking, snmalloc requires only read-write access to memory it manages and merely passes through other permissions, with the exception of vmmap, which it removes from any pointer it returns.

[^amplifier-state] As we are largely following the fat pointer model and its evolution into CHERI capabilities, we achieve amplification through a stateful, software mechanism, rather than an architectural mechanism. Specifically, the amplification mechanism will retain a superset of any authority it may be asked to reconstruct. There have, in times past, been capability systems with architectural amplification (e.g., HYDRA's type-directed amplification), but we believe that future systems are unlikely to adopt this latter approach, necessitating the changes we propose below.

[^bounds-precision] StrictProvenance architectures have historically differed in the precision with which authority can be represented. Notably, it may not be possible to achieve byte-granular authority boundaries at every size scale. In the case of CHERI specifically, snmalloc's size classes and its alignment policies are already much coarser than existing architectural requirements for representable authority on all existing implementations.